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THE FAILURE OF DISCLOSURE AS AN
APPROACH TO SHELTERS
David A. Weisbach*
ETER Canellos, in his article in this Volume,' discusses the re-
sponse to tax shelters by the highest levels of the tax practitioner
community. His article itself is representative of the unusual tradi-
tion in the tax bar of public spirited analysis that he discusses. One of the
great advantages of practicing and teaching tax law is the high level of
interaction between academics, practice, and policymaking. It is a plea-
sure to be able to comment on his article.
Canellos argues that the combination of properly structured disclosure
of and penalties on tax shelters is sufficient to stop or at least slow down
the current tax shelter boom. The argument is that the economics of the
shelter industry rely on the audit lottery rather than on substantive tax
law. Taxpayers compare the probability of being caught and the cost of
being caught with the potential tax savings. Under current law, there is
no incentive not to buy a lottery ticket in the form of a bogus shelter
because the chance of being caught is low and, if one is caught, there is
little or no downside in the form of penalties. If we believe courts gener-
ally can differentiate between permissible, aggressive tax planning and
impermissible tax shelters, we can change these odds without changing
substantive law. Disclosure increases the chance of being caught and
penalties create a-cost to being caught. Properly structured disclosure
and penalties should be sufficient and a new substantive disallowance
rule is not needed. Moreover, to the extent a substantive disallowance
rule, such as a strengthened profit requirement, substance over form re-
quirement, or motive requirement, changes current law, it can only do
harm. The relationship between substance and form under current law is
nuanced and important. Many ordinary business transactions rely on the
subtleties of this distinction. A substantive disallowance rule, by chang-
ing the relationship between form and substance, has the potential to play
havoc with current law. A substantive disallowance rule, therefore, is not
necessary and potentially harmful. Disclosure and penalties are the cure.
I respectfully disagree with this conclusion. Although I believe that
disclosure and penalties will do no harm, I also believe that disclosure
* Professor, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Hal Gann and Cal Johnson
for their thoughts on the topics discussed here.
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and penalties will do little or nothing to stem the current tide of shelters.
A strong substantive disallowance rule (which I will also call an anti-shel-
ter doctrine) is necessary and appropriate. Our disagreement may stem
from the empirics-we have different views of the quality of current shel-
ters, the strength of current law, and of the abilities of courts. But this
disagreement may also mask a more fundamental issue, the appropriate
strength of a substantive disallowance rule. Even if Canellos' description
of modern shelters, current law, and courts is correct, even if courts
would consistently disallow many of the things Canellos would label shel-
ters if they were discovered, current law may be too weak. Perhaps
courts should disallow a much broader class of tax planning. I suspect we
disagree on this second, more fundamental, issue as well.
Section I discusses the empirics. I do not think courts would disallow
many current shelters were they caught nor do I think that disclosure is
necessary to catch, or is even about catching and auditing, more shelters.
Section II focuses on the more fundamental issue of the appropriate
strength of a substantive disallowance rule.
I. DISCLOSURE IS NOT ENOUGH
Canellos' argument for disclosure is based on the observation that tax
professionals and courts can readily distinguish tax shelters from real
transactions. The difference, Canellos argues, is multifaceted and not
narrowly based on a single test, such as the test proposed by the Treasury
Department. Canellos points to four factors that distinguish shelters
from other transactions. First, shelters exist principally to reduce taxes.
Second, tax shelters are generated and marketed by specialized tax shel-
ter promoters. Third, tax shelters often have accommodation parties. Fi-
nally, shelters are often scripted or preplanned (i.e., they have no real
economics). Based on these factors, and potentially others, courts and
practitioners can readily determine if a transaction is a shelter. If this is
true, there is little need to change the substantive law-shelters do not
work under substantive law and real transactions are safe.
Why then have we seen the explosion in tax shelters? Because taxpay-
ers are now playing the audit lottery. Find a tax position that is facially
plausible but that would never survive real scrutiny. Find a lawyer willing
to sell penalty protection in the form of an opinion. And then hope the
transaction is never caught. Disclosure and changes to the penalty rules
solve this problem by changing the returns to playing the audit lottery.
I fully support changing the returns to the audit lottery and I commend
Canellos and the bar associations for their support in this endeavor. En-
hanced penalties and higher opinion standards on lawyers, in particular,
may help. But the argument that this approach will stem the shelter
boom relies on the courts to recognize and strike down shelters. I have
less faith in courts and current law than do Canellos and the bar associa-
tions he discusses and, therefore, I do not believe disclosure and related
strategies such as changes to the penalty regime are sufficient.
[Vol. 54
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Courts regularly allow taxpayers to claim benefits from transactions
that would fall under Canellos' shelter rubric. These are transactions that
have little business purpose, no real economics, are marketed as shelters,
and have extraneous parties or steps. Cottage Savings,2 a favorite of the
tax bar, is a good example. Cottage Savings did not involve a real transac-
tion. Absolutely nothing happened except for tax. The economics of the
ACM transaction,3 an admitted shelter, swamp those of Cottage Savings.
In fact, it would be difficult to imagine arranging a transaction so that less
actually happens. And there was no point to the deal other than to raid
the Treasury. The business purpose was precisely zero, not even one-
tenth of percent. These transactions were also marketed widely. All the
shelter factors except the use of an accommodation parties (which were
not necessary) are present. Yet the taxpayer won in Cottage Savings.4
There are dozens of leveraged lease cases where the courts accepted
completely fictional arrangements as real. The leading case is Frank
Lyon.5 The facts of this sale-leaseback case are complex, but the bottom
line was that in virtually no event would the purported owner of the prop-
erty recover anything more than its original investment plus six percent
interest, and in virtually no event would the purported owner lose money.
The purported owner of the property had no involvement in the transac-
tion other than as a lender, but through fictions believed by the court, was
able to cast itself as an owner. Maybe sale-leasebacks should be allowed,
but the court did not make that policy judgment. Instead, the court was
completely fooled by the arrangement. It took a statutory change to limit
the shelters allowed by Frank Lyon and similar cases and abusive leasing
transactions are still common where they fall outside the statutory rules.6
The courts also have a mixed record dealing with straddle losses, again
requiring congressional action to fix. For example, in Smith,7 the court
found all of the factors required to claim a loss could be present in typical
straddle transactions. It found that property was acquired by the tax-
payer, a closed and completed transaction occurred in the taxable year,
the taxpayer had basis in the property, and the amount realized was as-
certainable. Therefore, the elements necessary to claim a capital loss
were present in closing one leg of a commodity straddle position. The
court further held that the transactions were neither shams nor devoid of
2. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
3. ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
4. The tax bar frequently defends the result in Cottage Savings with the argument
that the losses in that case were real economic losses. This defense falls short. The tax law
must police the use of realization to claim losses because taxpayers can choose to defer
realization of gains. A regime where taxpayer could simply check a box to claim losses or
gains without real economic changes would be a disaster. That is, because gains tend to be
deferred under the realization rule, we must design the realization rule to ensure that
losses cannot freely be accelerated. The tax law should require some real economic cost
for a taxpayer to claim a loss. The result in Cottage Savings undermines this basic structure
of the realization rule and, therefore, cannot be defended as an appropriate result.
5. Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
6. See I.R.C. § 469 (1994).
7. 78 T.C. 350 (1982), aff'd without op., 820 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1987).
HeinOnline  -- 54 S.M.U. L. Rev. 75 2001
SMU LAW REVIEW
economic substance based in part on the fact that futures contracts are
binding on the parties. Although the court ultimately held against the
taxpayer, the court did not understand the nature of these transactions.
The vast majority of straddles prior to the enactment of section 1092 were
pure tax creatures, as fake as the most blatant of modem corporate shel-
ters. There was no business purpose, and no economics, and they were
widely marketed by promoters. Under Canellos' concept of shelters,
straddles should never have been allowed. Congress eventually had to
enact legislation to stop these shelters.8
In NIPSCO,9 the taxpayer set up a shell subsidiary in the Netherlands
Antilles and borrowed money in the European markets through the sub-
sidiary. By running the money through the Netherlands Antilles, the tax-
payer avoided withholding taxes. While the transaction involved a real
borrowing, the entire structure of the transaction was purely tax driven.
A few pieces of paper filed with the government of a Caribbean island,
paper that had no effect on the underlying transaction, allowed the tax-
payer to avoid taxes. These transactions were marketed by shelter pro-
moters, involved extraneous parties and steps, were completely wired in
the sense that they did not change the economics of a transaction that
would otherwise have occurred, and were entered into solely to reduce
taxes. Every tax shelter factor was present. Like Frank Lyon and Smith,
NIPSCO had to be reversed through legislation. 10
In Chamberlin,1 a closely held corporation issued a non-taxable stock
dividend of preferred stock. Two days later as a result of lengthy prior
negotiations, virtually all of the shareholders sold the preferred stock to
two insurance companies for cash, claiming capital gains. It was contem-
plated that the preferred stock would be redeemed within seven years.
Effectively, the corporation sent cash to its shareholders by passing it
through an insurance company and by adding this extra step, converted
ordinary income into capital gain. This fits all of the shelter factors.
There was no purpose to this arrangement other than conversion. The
insurance companies acted as ready accommodation parties. I have no
idea whether the transaction was marketed by shelter promoters, but
clearly, it could have been and is similar to the transactions that are today
marketed by promoters. And the deal was completely wired, so that
there was little or no chance that the accommodation parties would, in
the end, have a real interest in the corporation. But the court agreed with
the taxpayer. And once again, Congress had to intervene because the
result was so patently ridiculous. 12
I could go on for pages describing the silly results in cases such as
8. See I.R.C. § 1092.
9. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 341 (1995).
10. See I.R.C. § 7701(1).
11. Chamberlin v. Comm'r, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953).
12. See I.R.C. § 306.
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Woods Investment, Esmark, Beck Builders, Chisholm13 and others. There
is a long line of jurisprudence in the tax law to the effect that taxpayers
are allowed to structure transactions to minimize taxes and are allowed to
rely on the law as it is written. For every case looking to substance over
form or business purpose over tax motive, there is an equal and opposite
case respecting a transaction that fits Canellos' description of shelters.
There are good arguments that the decisions in many of these cases were
correct and good arguments that they were incorrect. I do not think,
however, that a debate about the merits of each individual case would be
helpful. Maybe a few would get switched from the "decided wrong" cate-
gory to the "decided right" category or vice versa. (Even debating this is
difficult without a theory of tax avoidance, which Canellos does not pro-
vide and which I will not discuss until the next section.) But I think a
perusal of the cases shows that courts are often quite literal in their inter-
pretation of the tax law, and if someone finds a winding path through
dozens of complex, interacting code provisions that leads to a tax goodie,
all the better for the taxpayer. I do not believe we can rely on courts and
current law to police shelters.
My experience with tax practitioners is similar to my reading of the
case law. Many transactions never make it to court. Instead, they require
immediate reversal by Congress or the Treasury Department because the
results they produce are so ridiculous. Yet good practitioners from
respected firms, not just tax promoters crawling out from under rocks,
offer opinions on these deals. For example, leveraged Morris Trust trans-
actions allowed cash sales of businesses without tax. These transactions
were given strong opinions by serious practitioners, but were later disal-
lowed (prospectively) with support from the major bar associations.14
Reverse MIPS, which never were offered because the Treasury issued a
ruling prior to their introduction, would have allowed equity to be treated
as debt, at least if one is to believe the opinions of top level practition-
ers.' 5 The current President of the ABA recently defended in print the
UPS transaction, a transaction involving a sham off-shore subsidiary that
surely falls into Canellos' description of tax shelters (and if it does not,
the case is relatively easy that disclosure is not enough).' 6 Joe Bankman,
last year, described a loss importation shelter, in which, through a com-
plex scheme with a trumped-up business purpose, artificial losses were
generated off-shore and then essentially sold to corporations to use
against their tax liability.17 Once again, good practitioners were giving
13. See Woods Inv. v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 274 (1985); Esmark Inc. v. Comm'r, 886 F.2d
1318 (7th Cir. 1989); Henry C. Beck Builders Inc. v. Comm'r, 41 TC 616 (1964); Chisholm
v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, Helvering v. Chisholm, 296 U.S. 641
(1935).
14. See I.R.C. § 355(e).
15. See I.R.S. Notice 94-48, 1994-01 C.B. 357.
16. See David Lupi-Sher, As Briefs are Filed, Practitioners Question Decision in UPS
Case, 89 TAx NoTEs 200, 203 (Oct. 9, 2000) (quoting Pamela Olson).
17. See Joseph Bankman, The New Market for Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NoTEs
1775 (1999).
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opinions on these transactions. Plenty of practitioners also offered opin-
ions on step-down preferred and liquidating REIT transactions. The list
of transactions, like the list of cases, is almost endless. If Canellos intends
to rely on the tax bar to help police the shelter mess, he is looking in the
wrong place.
If Canellos thinks the tax bar can tell good deals from bad, why are
they giving support to such junk? The reason the tax bar gives support to
this junk goes back to the case law. Many of these transactions work
under current law. This means that they do not rely on the audit lottery.
Disclosure and penalties would not stop them. Indeed, some of these
deals were public. To stop these shelters we need to change the substan-
tive law, not just rely on disclosure and penalties.
The basic economics of corporate shelters also makes it hard to believe
that any sizeable percentage rely on the audit lottery. Few companies
want to reduce earnings even if doing so produces real tax savings.
Therefore, most shelters produce tax losses but not book losses. These
shelters will show up as Schedule M adjustments. While Schedule M's
can be long and complex, shelters of reasonable size are likely to be
spotted.
If Schedule M's are insufficient, the IRS can readily require better re-
cord keeping or revise the Schedule M to allow better scrutiny. This, of
course, leaves private companies and individuals who do not file Schedule
M's, but my impression is that the vast majority of shelter activity takes
place in the public company context. The basic point, however, applies
even in the private company context: we do not need legislation or new
regulations to address the problem of discovery of shelters during audits;
changing tax forms or record keeping requirements would suffice.
Disclosure, instead, is about letting the policy makers in Washington
find out about shelters more quickly. Disclosure lets the policy makers
evaluate shelters sooner and decide whether the law needs to be changed
to prevent them. The stories of tax shelter descriptions arriving at the
Treasury in plain brown envelopes reflect why this type of disclosure is
needed. But the Treasury only needs to know about shelters to the extent
that they plausibly work under current law. (The Treasury need not
waste time on shelters that blatantly do not work.) The benefit of disclo-
sure comes only if the government is willing to change, or at least clarify,
the law. Therefore, we should compare disclosure and frequent changes
to the law with a broad substantive disallowance rule. Here, Canellos
and the bar associations are on weak ground. As Joe Bankman pointed
out several years ago, the government regularly shutting down shelters
actually feeds the shelter market because it creates a demand for the ser-
vices of tax shelter providers. 18 In addition, frequent changes that shut
down shelters impose costs on other taxpayers in the form of enormous
18. See id.
[Vol. 54
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complexity. The combination of disclosure and frequent changes is infer-
ior to a broad substantive disallowance rule.
Perhaps our reading of the cases (and practitioner opinions) reflects
more than a mere disagreement about the quality of the decisions. We
may simply draw the line between aggressive tax planning and shelters in
different places. For example, Canellos indicates that he thinks the trans-
actions illustrated in UPS, Winn-Dixie, and Compaq19 are in the hinter-
land between merely aggressive transactions and tax shelters while I
think these transactions were clearly in the shelter camp. And Canellos
takes a relatively benign view of financial products (call them an intersti-
tial class between real transactions and shelters) while I view much finan-
cial planning as inappropriately and inefficiently tax driven. Maybe
Canellos thinks that the transactions exemplified in Cottage, Smith, Frank
Lyon, NIPSCO, Chamberlin, and other similar cases were all also per-
fectly fine, in which case he is right to conclude that, given this baseline,
there is no need to change substantive law. Perhaps, then, we disagree
about the appropriate strength of anti-shelter doctrines. I turn to this
issue now.
II. THE CASE FOR A STRONG ANTI-SHELTER DOCTRINE
Let me begin the case for a strong anti-shelter doctrine by putting aside
two issues. First, some have argued that the tax law is best implemented
through a strict rule-bound system.20 Neither Canellos nor most bar as-
sociations take this position, and I agree with them. The tax law is best
implemented through a combination of rules and standards that can over-
ride the rules in situations where strict application of the rules produces
perverse results. As I have argued previously, this is the most cost-effec-
tive method of implementing the tax law. Overriding standards allow
rules to cover most common situations without the complexity that would
come from ensuring perfect application in all cases.21 The question is the
appropriate strength of those standards, not whether standards of this
type have a place in the tax law.
Second, we should not be distracted by attempts to codify a substantive
disallowance doctrine. Canellos argues that the distinction between shel-
ters and other transactions is multifaceted and not reducible to a single
formula. I generally agree with him on this, although one can imagine
giving more (or less) content to anti-shelter doctrines than does current
law. Thus, we can agree that Treasury's recent attempt to codify anti-
shelter doctrines may be doomed even if we disagree about their appro-
priate strength. But regardless of whether they are best implemented as a
19. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. 262 (1999); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 254 (1999); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 363 (1999).
20. See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U.
CHic. L. REV. 859 (1982).
21. See David Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860 (1999).
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rule or a standard, we can and should think about the strength of anti-
shelter doctrines.
With these two issues put aside, we can turn to the question of the
appropriate strength of anti-shelter doctrines. I think it is clear that cur-
rent doctrines are too weak. The most straightforward evidence is the
growth of a large, profitable tax shelter industry under current standards.
The shelters promoted by this industry waste resources and distort trans-
actions. Resources are transferred from individuals who do not shelter to
those who do shelter, creating no net gain. In addition, the transfer takes
resources, such as lawyer and banker time and the costs of distorted
transactions, which go entirely to waste. The activity is non-productive.
If it is possible, it should be eliminated, just like we might want to elimi-
nate other entirely wasteful activity.
There is nothing in this logic to distinguish a special class of transac-
tions labeled "shelters" from all other tax planning. Most tax planning is
wasteful activity and we should not be shy about restricting it severely.
Although not strictly an externality under textbook definitions, externali-
ties can serve as a useful analogy. Individuals see a benefit to tax plan-
ning, but do not consider the costs imposed on others through their tax
planning (higher taxes). Therefore, individuals have an incentive to en-
gage in too much of it. The standard solution to an externality is to force
individuals to consider the social as well as private effects of an activity,
say through a tax. The external costs of a tax planning are equal to the
taxes imposed on others, which is equal to the taxes saved through the tax
planning. That is, if we were to internalize the cost of tax planning, we
would force taxpayers to pay an amount equal to the taxes they save.
Therefore, the optimal policy would be to eliminate tax planning
altogether.22
We, of course, cannot do this because we generally cannot determine
what the individual would have done absent planning. Completely elimi-
nating tax planning would be costly. 23 If there is some cost to eliminating
tax planning, we may not want to go that far. We must balance the margi-
nal benefit of reducing tax planning through stronger anti-shelter doc-
trines with the marginal cost of these doctrines. But the starting point of
analysis should be the goal of eliminating virtually all tax planning and
the limitation should be based only on the potential costs of doing so. We
should not be shy about very strong anti-tax planning doctrines.
22. There may be some activities of tax lawyers that are welfare enhancing. Interpret-
ing the law to ensure compliance and instructing clients on the sometimes bizarre require-
ments the law imposed to get a contemplated benefit are likely to be beneficial. But very
little of what tax planners do falls into this category.
23. If we cannot perfectly identify tax planning, attempts to stop it will impose dead-
weight loss. The reason is that taxpayers will alter their behavior to avoid the anti-shelter
doctrines. For a discussion of this point and other subtleties created by imposing anti-
shelter doctrines, see David Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Doc-
trines, Univ. of Chic. Law and Econ. Working Paper 99 (2d Series) (2000).
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If current law were adequate for so many years, why should we con-
sider changing the law now? The reason is that clearly something has
changed with the rise of the current shelter boom. Although we do not
know for sure, the increasing sophistication of tax lawyers and promoters,
the rise of derivatives, and the globalization of markets all seem to have
created vast new opportunities for sheltering income. Shelters are
cheaper and safer than ever before. The tax law needs to be adjusted to
take into account this new reality.
If we can talk in terms of presumptions, if only to organize our
thoughts, I think this establishes a prima facie case for stronger anti-shel-
ter doctrines. The objections to stronger anti-shelter doctrines cannot
overturn this presumption. One objection is that a strong anti-shelter
doctrines would interfere with the right to tax plan. But this right can be
reduced, limited, or completely taken away by Congress whenever it feels
like it. Congress can overrule each and every case establishing such a
right with the stroke of a pen. And as a policy matter, the scope of the
right to tax plan has to be part of the question rather than an assumed
answer. Along the same lines, stronger anti-shelter doctrines would not,
by definition, impede on legitimate tax planning because the scope of le-
gitimate tax planning is the question on the table.
A more serious objection to anti-shelter doctrines is that they would
create great uncertainty. But the argument is usually just left at that, as if
it were self-evident that uncertainty is a bad thing that should be avoided
at all costs. But this is not the case. First, note that even if uncertainty is
bad, there is a trade-off between the good of a substantive disallowance
rule and the bad of uncertainty, and it is not clear that the race should
necessarily go to uncertainty. In addition, businesses deal with uncer-
tainty all the time, and it is not clear why tax uncertainty is any worse
than uncertainty about, say, the weather or about the standard of due
care under a negligence rule. Finally, uncertainty about the tax law may
not even be bad. There is a lot of literature about the effects of uncer-
tainty in the tax law and in other areas of law. The general thrust is that
uncertainty generally does not have uniformly bad or good effects and
that we should have no presumption that reducing uncertainty (even for
free) is a good thing.24 None of this literature has been incorporated into
the tax shelter debate. While uncertainty may play a role in the debate
over anti-shelter doctrines, the assumption that it is a strong argument
against these doctrines is false. We cannot say that uncertainty is necessa-
rily bad and cannot say that we should not impose significant uncertainty
if it is needed to implement strong anti-shelter doctrines.
Yet another objection is that the government sometimes uses the tax
law to create incentives and a strong substantive disallowance rule would
24. See, e.g., Richard Craswell & John Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Stan-
dards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986); Joseph Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient
Taxation, 17 J. PuB. ECON. 213 (1982); Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel Slemrod, Randomness in
Tax Enforcement, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 17 (1989).
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get in the way of these incentives. This objection seems relatively trivial
to me. A strong substantive disallowance should take into account con-
gressional intent and it should not be difficult to identify those places
where the government intended certain transactions to be subsidized. A
strong presumption against finding an intent to subsidize a transaction
will force Congress to be clear and prevent creative statutory
interpretation.
Canellos raises a more nuanced objection to strong anti-shelter rules.
He argues that the relationship between form and substance is subtle and
that stronger anti-shelter doctrines may disrupt this relationship. For ex-
ample, the willingness to disregard a temporary subsidiary created only to
merge into a target allowed the creation of the reverse subsidiary merger
form in the United States. Germany did not have this form of merger
because of its refusal to disregard form. Canellos is right about the need
to be careful about the distinction between form and substance, but I do
not think a stronger, even a much stronger, anti-shelter doctrine would
affect these transactions very much. The transactions Canellos is worried
about have business purposes and expose the taxpayer to risk. The re-
sults claimed in these transactions are also justifiable. They have little to
worry about from strong anti-shelter doctrines. And if strong anti-shelter
doctrines do catch a few transactions that we might otherwise allow, it is
hard to see the harm. Taxpayers are very good at pointing out the injus-
tices of the tax system to Congress and the Treasury, and the tax rules can
be and frequently are changed to eliminate the problems.
There are other objections to a strong anti-shelter doctrines, but the
point here is not to provide the definitive statement in support of such a
doctrine. Instead, I wish merely to suggest that the case for such a doc-
trine is persuasive. Even if Canellos is right about how courts decide
shelter cases, I still disagree that disclosure and penalties are enough.
Many things that he labeled aggressive tax planning under current law
should be disallowed under a better law. This type of activity produces
no social benefit, wastes resources, and would not be that costly to
reduce.
Much more could be said on the topic of tax shelters. I have not even
touched on the appropriate content of anti-shelter doctrines. Incentives
on the tax bar and ethical standards deserve attention. The allocation of
the power to interpret statutes between courts and the Treasury must be
studied. My goal here is only to establish that disclosure and penalties
alone are not sufficient and that there is a good case for strong anti-shel-
ter doctrines.
[Vol. 54
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